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a b s t r a c t
Why do individuals engage in self-defeating behaviors like self-harm, addiction, and risky
sexual behaviors? Why do they experience the apathy of depression or inaction when
trapped by multiple competing problems? We propose a framework for explaining these
and other related behaviors based on the insight that individuals can only experience a
limited number of latent stimuli to which they are exposed. We conduct an experiment to
test this model and ﬁnd that more than two thirds of the subjects behave consistent with
our theoretical framework.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Economists have long been interested in why individuals engage in self-defeating behaviors. Such behaviors
include seemingly myopic ﬁnancial decisions, addiction,
risky sexual behaviors, self-harm, and apparent apathy
in response to the challenges of life. Behavioral explanations for these pervasive issues may include lack of
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self-control (Strotz, 1955), hyperbolic discounting (Thaler,
1981; Rachlin et al., 1991), and the cognitive strains of
poverty (Ridley et al., 2020; Dean et al., 2019; Kremer et al.,
2019). Some economists have modeled behaviors such as
addiction as a rational choice in a setting with dynamic
costs and beneﬁts (Becker and Murphy, 1988).
We propose another framework for explaining these
behaviors based on the insight that individuals can only
experience a limited number of latent stimuli to which they
are exposed. This is consistent with research in psychology
suggesting that individuals can only attend to a very limited
number of stimuli (Colin, 1953; Treisman and Gelade, 1980;
McCaul and Haugtvedt, 1982; Borkovec and Roemer, 1995).
Our model can explain a variety of seemingly dysfunctional
behaviors including self-harm, the apathy of depression,
and the inaction of individuals trapped by multiple competing problems. In addition, we provide an empirical test
of the model in the lab and ﬁnd that it can explain behavior
of 68 percent of our subjects.
To understand the intuition underlying our model, consider an individual who is exposed to many latent stimuli
but prone to experience only the most salient one. Suppose
an individual is watching a movie, with a utility measure of
10, while experiencing a headache, with a utility measure of
−2. Suppose further that the movie and headache each have
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a subjective measure of salience, and that the individual
only experiences the utility of the most salient stimulus.1
If the salience of the movie exceeds that of the headache,
the individual does not notice the headache in the background and enjoys a utility of 10 from watching the movie.
On the other hand, if the salience of the headache exceeds
that of the movie, then the individual cannot pay attention
to the movie and instead experiences the utility level of the
headache, −2. What are the behavioral implications of such
a decision maker?
This framework has the power to explain a variety of
interesting economic behaviors and phenomena. Naturally,
this model predicts that individuals and ﬁrms will often
bundle unpleasant stimuli with a more pleasant distraction
(Filcheck et al., 2005; Milkman et al., 2014; Al-Khotani et al.,
2016). Hence, individuals may listen to music while exercising or watch TV while prone in the dentist’s chair. More
signiﬁcantly, however, the model rationalizes a number of
seemingly dysfunctional behaviors as well.
First, consider health-related behaviors such as selfharm, risky sexual behaviors, or substance abuse. In our
model, individuals may engage in such activities even if
they are not intrinsically pleasurable in isolation. Suppose
an individual is exposed to an emotionally painful event,
perhaps due to poor mental health or a difﬁcult interpersonal conﬂict. In this case, an individual may engage
in cutting, not because the stimulus is pleasurable but
rather because it has higher utility than the emotional
suffering and is more salient. In this sense, it acts as an effective, if unpleasant, distraction from an even more painful
stimulus. While the individual would prefer a pleasant distraction, there may not exist any pleasant experiences that
are sufﬁciently salient to distract from the emotional suffering. In this sense, the self-harming behavior serves as a
feasible optimal distraction.
Second, our model explains the behavior of individuals experiencing depression. We model depression as a
very salient negative stimulus. Because depression is so
salient, it crowds out the utility associated with activities
that would normally be considered pleasant. Consequently,
depressed individuals have little motivation to engage in a
variety of activities associated with a functional life. Indeed,
to the extent that the only stimuli sufﬁciently salient to
break through depression are either risky or harmful, our
model also explains why depressed individuals are at risk
of illicit drug use, overeating, and self-harm.
Third, our model predicts that individuals experiencing multiple problems have a diminished incentive to ﬁx
any single problem. This is because the beneﬁt of removing one negative stimulus is negligible if the individual
is also experiencing another more salient negative stimulus. Even the beneﬁt of solving the problem associated
with the most salient negative stimulus is limited by the
fact that removing the stimulus will simply bring another
problem to the fore of the individual’s attention. In this
manner, individuals may appear apathetic about improv-

ing their situation in the presence of multiple problems.
This can explain why stressed individuals act in a manner
that seems self-defeating or why the poor make seemingly
irrational decisions (Schilbach et al., 2016; Haushofer and
Fehr, 2014).
We present empirical predictions of our model and test
them in a laboratory setting. The key prediction is that
an individual would always rank experiencing two stimuli simultaneously between the two stimuli separately. In
particular, when the stimuli are undesirable, then the individual would rank two bad things as weakly better than just
the worst of the two. We examine this in the case of subjects who are asked their willingness to endure listening to
a painfully loud ﬁre alarm, put a hand in ice cold water, or do
both at the same time. Strikingly, we ﬁnd that fully 68 percent of individuals weakly prefer to endure both negative
stimuli compared to enduring just the most painful one.
Of these, 13 percent have a strict preference. This is strong
evidence suggesting our model is empirically relevant in
explaining human behavior.
Our work relates to a growing body of research in health
economics on rational addiction (Becker and Murphy,
1988; Darden, 2017; Darden and Papageorge, 2018) and
studies in behavioral economics exploring the relationship
between cognitive function and poverty-induced stress.
Ridley et al. (2020), Kremer et al. (2019) and Dean et al.
(2019) document robust causal links between poverty,
psychological well-being, and economic behaviors. They
describe a feedback loop in which poverty reinforces itself
through reduced cognitive function. We contribute to this
literature by presenting an additional explanation for why
the poor and those in otherwise difﬁcult circumstances
often engage in seemingly irrational behaviors. We also
contribute to prior empirical work in economics which
has explored the relationship between self-harm behaviors and employment, income, and education (Hansen and
Lang, 2011; Marcotte, 2003; Rodriguez Andres, 2006) as
well as depression and mental health in contexts like fertility (Wilson, 2019), unemployment (Hakulinen et al., 2019;
Tefft, 2011; Marcus, 2013; Green, 2011), crime (Mahuteau
and Zhu, 2015), and human capital accumulation (Patton
et al., 2016).
This paper also contributes to a long-standing literature
in psychology, cognitive science and decision theory, which
we discuss in detail in Section 3 below.
2. Examples
Before proceeding to a formal development of our
model, we present several simple examples that demonstrate the relevance of our idea. These examples explain
a number of behaviors of interest to economists, clinical
psychologists, and policy makers.
For these examples, we assume that each stimulus is
indexed by a measure of utility and a measure of salience.
Like utility, salience is subjective and thus derived from
preferences. When exposed to a set of stimuli, an individual experiences the utility of the stimulus within this set
that has the highest salience. That is, for stimulus x, let
u(x) denote the individual’s utility of x and let s(x) denote
the individual’s salience of x. If X = {x, y, z, . . .} is the indi-

1
This corresponds to our main model. We also present a more general
model that allows the individual to experience the utility of a less salient
stimulus, but doing so requires a ‘concentration cost.’
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vidual’s set of stimuli, then the utility experienced by the
individual under X is
U(X) = maxx ∈ X u(x) subjectto s(x) ≥ s(y) forall y ∈ X.

et al., 2015; Swannell et al., 2014; Somer et al., 2015;
Kharsati and Bhola, 2016).
To explain self-injury in the context of our framework,
suppose there are three possible stimuli with the following
utilities and salience.

(1)

Underlying our model is the assumption that an individual
is aware of all stimuli to which she is exposed, with their
corresponding measures of utility and salience.
Returning to the headache and movie example of the introduction, we have u(movie) = 10
and u(headache) = −2. If we had s(movie) = 5 and
s(headache) = 10, then the individual would experience
the utility U({movie, headache}) = −2 since the headache
is more salient.
While the above utility function takes the same form
as one attributed to Strotz (1955) in the temptation literature, we reinterpret the framework to generate important
insights in very different domains. We discuss the relationship between our work and Strotz (1955) further in Section
3 following the presentation of our examples.

Stimulus
g
b
h

u
1
−2
−1

s
0
3
4

We think of g as a good stimulus, b as a bad stimulus (e.g.
being in an abusive relationship), and h as self-harm (i.e.
a negative but salient stimulus). The utility an individual
receives from a set of stimuli is given by U in Eq. (1).
Suppose that life can either be going well or poorly for
the decision maker. If life is going well, then he experiences
the set {g}. If life is going poorly, then he experiences the
set {g, b}. Suppose further that the decision maker has the
ability to add h to any set of experiences. If life is going well,
then he would rather not have h present. i.e.
U({g}) > U({g, h}).
However, when life is going poorly, then this preference
switches and the individual does want stimulus h present.
I.e.

2.1. Self-injury
I used self-injury as a coping mechanism to help me
overcome the emotional stress that I was incapable of
dealing with in any other way. Self-injury was a means
of escape, a way to relieve the numbness, and an expression of the pain within me.
–Giblin (2006), Hailey’s Story.

U({g, b, h}) > U({g, b}).
Thus when things are going well, the decision maker will
not engage in self-harm. However, if life takes a turn for the
worse, then the decision maker will engage in self-harm in
order to distract himself from the bad stimulus.
This example is of relevance to economists considering
the causes of a variety of destructive behaviors. For example, Carpenter et al. (2017) ﬁnd that substance abuse is
more common among individuals facing economic hardship. Our model predicts that this would be the case.
Additionally, it suggests that efforts to treat substance
abuse may be of limited effectiveness without either alleviating the underlying stress that made it optimal in the
ﬁrst place or providing alternative, less harmful, strategies
for distraction. More broadly, Cawley and Ruhm (2011)
explores the economic models for risky behaviors and
evidence for such models. Our framework provides an additional lens through which to analyze such behaviors.
Similarly, by understanding some risky behaviors as an
optimized response to a set of stimuli, clinicians may have
better insights into how to help individuals in such conditions. For example, McCart et al. (2014) outlines a set
of therapy strategies for youth struggling with substance
abuse and risky sexual behaviors. Our framework might
reﬁne contingency contracting approaches described in
this paper in which therapists work with clients to discuss alternative rewards that can compete with the risky
behaviors.

Extensive prior research in psychology has explored the
factors that may lead people to engage in self-defeating
behaviors. These include creating boundaries (Suyemoto,
1998), replacing suicidal behaviors (Firestone and Seiden,
1990), stopping or eliciting dissociation (Herpertz, 1995;
Himber, 1994; Miller and Bashkin, 1974), controlling sexuality (Friedman et al., 1972) and externalizing emotions
(e.g., Friedman et al., 1972; Herpertz, 1995; Himber, 1994).
Theoretically, Nock and Prinstein (2004)’s four-function
model suggests a framework for understanding motivations for self-harm. Consistent with this framework, the
ﬁfth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or DSM-5, states that “most commonly, the
purpose is to reduce negative emotions, such as tension,
anxiety, and self-reproach, and/or to resolve an interpersonal difﬁculty.” Consequently, those who engage in NSSI
will often report an immediate sensation of relief that
occurs during the process. “When the behavior occurs frequently, it might be associated with a sense of urgency
and craving, the resultant behavioral pattern resembling
an addiction.”
Nock (2010) provides a comprehensive review of
research on NSSI in psychology. While there is no consensus on its exact prevalence, researchers estimate that
between 10 and 30 percent of adolescents in the general population engage in self-harming behaviors. Most
common among these behaviors are found to be cutting, burning, and overdosing on medications (Doyle
et al., 2015). Sociodemographic and psychological factors, including exposure to self-harming friends or family
members, dysfunctional family relationships, and sexual
orientation are found to be the strongest correlates (Doyle

2.2. Depression
To have depression is to have no motivation; No motivation to wake up, no motivation to socialize, no
motivation to live. It is a crushing weight that you just
need some support to lift.
–Anonymous (2014).
3
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Major Depressive Disorder is the most common mood
disorder in the US affecting over 16 million adults. The
DSM-5 characterizes depressive disorders by “sad, empty,
or irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive
changes that signiﬁcantly affect the individual’s capacity to
function.” Risk factors for depressive disorders include both
genetic and environmental factors. Additionally, bereavement and other severe life challenges can induce symptoms
of a depressive disorder without meeting the criteria for
such a diagnosis. Regardless of the causes of depressive disorders and symptoms, our framework provides insight into
the resulting behaviors.
Regarding major depressive episodes, the DSM-5
reports, “The mood in a major depressive episode is often
described by the person as depressed, sad, hopeless, discouraged, or ‘down in the dumps’.” However, on occasion
individuals “complain of feeling ‘blah,’ having no feelings,
or feeling anxious.” From these descriptions, it seems reasonable to model the phenomenon of depression as an
extremely salient, and generally negative, stimulus that
crowds out other feelings. In the context of our theoretical framework, the existence of such a powerful stimulus
provides a compelling explanation for a variety of observed
behaviors of individuals suffering from depression.
First, the DSM-5 states, “Loss of interest or pleasure is
nearly always present, at least to some degree. Individuals
may report feeling less interested in hobbies, ‘not caring
anymore,’ or not feeling any enjoyment in activities that
were previously considered pleasurable. In some individuals, there is a signiﬁcant reduction from previous levels
of sexual interest or desire.” To see how this relates to
our model, consider the following example. Assume three
possible stimuli: the absence of depression, g; depression,
d; and a pleasurable activity, a. The utility and salience of
these measures are given in the table below.
Stimulus
g
d
a

u
1
−10
5

ing salience which numbs an individual to other stimuli,
both pleasant and unpleasant.
Second, the DSM-5 indicates that depression is often
comorbid with substance-related disorders and that while
some depressed individuals display a lack of interest in
food, others report increased appetite and weight gain.
Similarly, prior research has found a signiﬁcant relationship between depression and unhealthy behaviors such as
smoking, obesity, physical inactivity, heavy drinking, workforce productivity, educational attainment, and suicide in
various cross-sections of adults in the US (Strine et al.,
2008; Beck et al., 2011; Berndt et al., 1998; Kessler, 2012).
Zetterqvist (2015) reports that among individuals engaging in NSSI, 70–80 percent are depressed as well. These
behaviors associated with depression are consistent with
our explanation of self-harm in the prior section. Indeed,
depressed individuals are likely to engage in any behavior
which is more pleasant than depression and sufﬁciently
salient to increase their utility.
Our model predicts that depression is likely to compete for attention with tasks associated with productivity
in the labor market and household. Consistent with this
prediction, several studies have found that depressive
symptoms are negatively associated with economic productivity (Peng et al., 2016), employment (Frasquilho
et al., 2016), income (Lund et al., 2010) and food insecurity (Noonan et al., 2016). In addition to its adverse
effects on cognitive function, Ridley et al. (2020) ﬁnd that
depression may also distort beliefs individuals hold about
themselves or the world. This results in depressed individuals being more likely to remember negative stimuli
(Gotlib and Joormann, 2010) and updating their beliefs
more pessimistically (Korn et al., 2014). Our framework
complements these studies and suggests that the economic
beneﬁts of effective treatments for depression are likely to
be substantial.

s
0
10
5

2.3. The trap of competing problems

An individual will enjoy the pleasurable activity in the
absence of depression, since U({g, a}) > U({g}). However,
when depression is within the set of stimuli, an individual
will not ﬁnd that the pleasurable activity increases utility
since it is not sufﬁciently salient to be enjoyable, yielding
U({d, a}) = U({d}). Thus for sufﬁciently salient depression,
individuals would become indifferent to many activities
they would otherwise ﬁnd enjoyable.2
A similar example can explain the difﬁculty that, according to the DSM-5, depressed individuals exhibit in thinking,
concentration, and decision making. Note that depression
need not be associated with very low utility or extreme
sadness in order to bring about these changes in behavior.
Indeed, what is most signiﬁcant is not the utility associated
with the stimulus of depression but rather its overwhelm-

Shawn, an ofﬁce manager in Cleveland, was struggling
to make ends meet. He was late on a bunch of bills.
His credit cards were maxed out. His paycheck ran out
quickly. As he said, “There is always more month than
money.” Every phone call made him tense: another
creditor calling to “remind” him? Being out of money
was also affecting his personal life. And there was no
end in sight. He had bought a Blu-ray player on credit,
with no payments for the ﬁrst six months. That was
ﬁve months ago. How would he pay this extra bill next
month?
–Mullainathan and Shaﬁr (2013)
Researchers have long puzzled over why individuals
in difﬁcult situations fail to undertake action to improve
their situation, or even engage in behavior that would
seem to exacerbate the difﬁculties they already face.3 Going

2
An alternative way to model depression is to think of it as a disorder
in which the salience of negative stimuli is increased relative to that of
positive stimuli. Such a model would similarly predict diminished interest
in formerly pleasant activities and also predict that individuals dwell on
negative stimuli.

3
Long-standing work on ego depletion by Baumeister et al. (1998),
Muraven et al. (1998), Muraven and Baumeister (2000), and Schmeichel
and Vohs (2009), for example, relates one’s self-control to a muscle that
grows tired with repeated use. Self-control governs thoughts, feelings,

4

L.J. Lefgren, O.B. Stoddard and J.E. Stovall

Journal of Health Economics 76 (2021) 102407

back to Strotz (1955), economists have also considered the
possibility that individuals have limited self-control and
hence are subject to temptation that they may wish to
avoid. Furthermore, Mani et al. (2013) show that individuals in poverty demonstrate reduced cognitive function that
prevents them from making optimal ﬁnancial decisions.
The evidence for these theories is compelling. Our framework, however, presents an additional explanation for such
behaviors.
In particular, when individuals face a large number of
problems or negative stimuli, the effect on their realized
utility of eliminating one negative stimulus may be quite
small. An individual who receives utility only from the
most salient stimulus has no incentive to remove a negative stimulus that is insufﬁciently salient to be felt. Even
when the experienced negative stimulus is undesirable, the
beneﬁt of eliminating it may be limited by the fact that
another negative, if slightly less salient, stimulus will simply be brought to the fore of the individual’s attention. This
intuition is similar to that of a competing risks model in
epidemiology. The life-saving beneﬁt of curing one illness
is limited by the health risks posed by a second. For example, reducing the health risks of heart disease by dieting are
negligible for an individual diagnosed with terminal cancer.
Consider the following example that illustrates this
intuition. Suppose that there are three possible stimuli with
the following utilities and salience.
Stimulus
g
b
w

u
1
−2
−3

Of course the individual would prefer to have no negative stimuli in his stimulus set. However, this example
demonstrates that the existence of multiple problems
limits the willingness to eliminate any one problem. Consequently, individuals with a variety of problems may not
ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁx any of them depending on their constraints. They may also ﬁnd it suboptimal to prevent the
occurrence of new problems. Hence, behavior that may
seem irrational, impulsive, or demonstrating poor cognitive function may instead reﬂect the complementarity of
negative stimuli arising from the fact that once a person has
problems, adding more problems may not change experienced utility.
Our model suggests that clinicians may want to consider the full portfolio of an individual’s challenges when
providing treatment on how to improve a client’s situation. In particular, an individual may not ﬁnd it meaningful
to improve in one domain unless he or she is better able
to cope in another, possibly seemingly unrelated, domain.
Hence, our model suggests a broader and more holistic
approach to helping individuals facing multiple problems.
This model may also be of relevance in health
economics. Speciﬁcally, if individuals from low-income
backgrounds or disadvantaged minority groups face a variety of negative stimuli in their life, it may not seem optimal
to engage in behaviors to improve health. Pampel et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that low-income individuals engage in fewer
behaviors to improve health than high-income individuals. Similarly, Escarce et al. (1993) ﬁnd that elderly African
Americans are substantially less likely to utilize medical
services than whites despite having the same access to
Medicare. Future researchers may wish to examine specifically whether exposure to multiple problems reduces
willingness of individuals to invest in their health.
We recognize that this trap of competing problems
example presupposes an individual is aware of all stimuli
to which she is latently exposed, even though she experiences the utility of only the most salient one. This means
that she is aware both of the utility and salience of stimuli that are in the background of her attention. People’s
ability to respond to surveys (such as the General Social
Survey) about a variety of problems and anxieties suggests
that individuals are aware of many challenges to which
they are exposed. It also seems likely that individuals who
distract themselves know the consequences of removing
the distraction—indeed the decision to distract is based on
personal experience regarding the utility and salience of
the distraction and the stimulus being avoided. We are not
aware, however, of evidence of broader metacognition of
the full set of stimuli to which an individual is exposed.
Such research would provide important insight regarding
the existence and nature of the trap of competing problems.

s
0
3
4

We think of g as a good stimulus, b as a bad stimulus
(e.g. being unemployed), and w as a worse stimulus (e.g.
marital problems).
Suppose the decision maker is experiencing the set
{g, b, w}, but has the ability to remove b from this set.
If he does this, he will experience utility U({g, w}) = −3.
However, U({g, b, w}) = −3. Thus the decision maker is not
willing to pay any cost to remove only b from this stimulus
set.
Even the willingness to remove the worse stimulus, w,
is limited by the existence of the bad stimulus, b. An individual experiencing the set {g, w} would be willing to pay
a utility cost up to 4 to eliminate w from the stimulus
set. However, if the decision maker is experiencing the set
{g, b, w}, he would only be willing to pay a utility cost of 1
or less to eliminate w.
This example also highlights the indifference of individuals experiencing negative stimuli to the addition of
other negative stimuli. To an individual with the preferences we describe, U({g, b, w}) = U({g, w}) and U({b, w}) =
U({w}). Hence the addition of the bad stimulus, b, to the set
that already includes the worse stimulus, w, has no effect
on realized utility.

3. Theory
These preceding examples highlight the economic relevance of our model. In this section, we provide a brief
technical treatment of the Strotz (1955) utility representation and also consider alternative utility representations.
This formalization provides empirical predictions which
are testable in the lab.

physical endurance, and task persistence. They ﬁnd that while human
behavior is governed by automatic and controlled processes, it is possible to override these processes at a signiﬁcant cost to one’s self-control
resources. In situations where people face constant stress such as enduring multiple negative experiences and depression, they ﬁnd themselves in
a chronic state of self-control depletion, which keeps them from making
the changes in their life necessary to improve their conditions.
5
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3.1. Model

the utility of a stimulus other than the most salient one, but
doing so requires exerting some mental effort. To see this,
rewrite U GP is

Let A denote the (ﬁnite) set of possible stimuli, and let
P(A) denote the set of all subsets of A. A decision maker
will experience a set of stimuli X ∈ P(A), and has a preference relation  over P(A). We deﬁne  and ∼ in the usual
way. We say U represents  if U(X) ≥ U(Y ) if and only if
X  Y . Note that we include the empty set in our domain.
For all of the following representations and without loss of
generality, we set the utility of the empty set equal to zero.

U GP (X) = maxx ∈ X [u(x) − cs (x, X)] ,
where cs (x, X) = maxy ∈ X s(y) − s(x). The function cs (x, X)
represents the cost of concentrating on x ∈ X. Thus a decision maker with GP preferences evaluates sets of stimuli
according to the utility function u net concentration costs.5
To better illustrate the intuition of the GP representation, it is helpful to go back to the motivating example
from our introduction. Recall that the utility of the movie
is 10 while that of the headache is −2. Further suppose that
the salience of the movie is 5, while that of the headache
is 10. Under the Strotz representation, an individual cannot enjoy the movie because the headache is more salient.
Under the GP framework, however, an individual could pay
a concentration cost (measured in utility) of 5, which is the
difference in salience between the two stimuli, to experience the utility of the movie. In this case, the individual
can still focus on the movie and beneﬁt from watching it,
but utility is lower since the concentration cost must be
deducted from the utility of the less salient stimulus.
It is straightforward to show that both the Strotz and GP
preferences satisfy:

Deﬁnition. We say  has a Strotz representation if there
exist real-valued functions u and s such that
U S (X) = maxx ∈ X u(x) subjectto s(x) ≥ s(y) forall y ∈ X,
represents . If  has a Strotz representation, then we say
that  is a Strotz preference.
Strotz’s original model was one of changing tastes, and
he considered how a self-aware individual might behave
in such a situation. He proposed that the decision maker
would prefer commitment. However in the absence of commitment opportunities, Strotz proposed the “strategy of
consistent planning”: Today’s self chooses a plan of consumption that tomorrow’s self will actually implement. In
this interpretation of U S , s represents tomorrow’s preferences while u represents today’s.
One possible objection to the Strotz representation is
that it is overly restrictive in the sense that the decision
maker can only pay attention the most salient stimulus.
Could one not ignore salient stimuli through effort and concentration? The next representation addresses this issue.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) (henceforth GP) extended
Strotz’s analysis to a setting of temptation and self-control
in a paper that kicked off a large decision theoretic literature on temptation.4 They introduced the following
representation.

Axiom (Set Betweenness). If X  Y , then X  X ∪ Y  Y .
However only the Strotz representation satisﬁes:
Axiom (No Compromise). For all X and Y , either X∼X ∪ Y
or Y ∼X ∪ Y .
Recognizing these differences will allow us to test in an
experimental setting whether a decision maker is consistent with the Strotz and GP preferences. It will also allow
us to potentially differentiate between the two models.6
One obvious alternative model to compare ours to is an
additive model. After all, if X represents the set of stimuli
experienced by the individual, perhaps the utility from X is
simply the sum of utilities from each stimulus:

Deﬁnition. We say  has a GP representation if there exist
real-valued functions u and s such that
U GP (X) = maxx ∈ X [u(x) + s(x)] − maxx ∈ X s(x),

U A (X) =

represents . If  has a GP representation, then we say that
 is a GP preference.
One way to think about the Strotz representation is as a
limiting case of the GP representation. To see this, consider
the GP representation
U˛GP (X) = maxx ∈ X [u(x) + ˛s(x)] − maxx ∈ X ˛s(x),



u(x).

x∈X

The key behavioral property of the additive model is that
any single stimulus is either always positive, always negative, or always neutral.

˛ > 0,

and note that U˛GP → U S as ˛ → ∞.
The GP representation can be applied in our setting of
sensory limitations. The functions u and s are the true utility
and salience respectfully, as before. However as opposed to
the Strotz representation, a decision maker can experience

5
The decision theoretic literature on temptation provides other possible models to extend to our setting of sensory limitations. For example,
representations could be adapted to allow for uncertainty about salience
(Stovall, 2010) or to allow for multiple measures of salience (Dekel et al.,
2009). However, to keep our paper focused, we do not introduce these
representations. In addition, our experiment does not provide enough
structure to differentiate these models from the GP representation.
6
Given the limited data we can observe in an experimental setting, we
can only potentially differentiate GP preferences from Strotz preferences;
we cannot differentiate Strotz preferences from GP preferences. This is
because any preference consistent with No Compromise is also consistent
with Set Betweenness, while there are preferences consistent with Set
Betweenness that are inconsistent with No Compromise (e.g. X  X ∪ Y 
Y ).

4
See Lipman and Pesendorfer (2013) for a survey of this literature. Also,
note that Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) set up is different than our ﬁnite
one. Speciﬁcally, their primitive is a preference relation over non-empty
compact subsets of lotteries over a compact metric space. See Gul and
Pesendorfer (2005) for an in depth analysis of these preferences in a ﬁnite
setting.
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Deﬁnition. We say stimulus x is universally positive if for
every X ∈
/ x we have X ∪ {x}  X. We say x is universally neg/ x we have X  X ∪ {x}. We say x is
ative if for every X ∈
universally neutral if for every X ∈
/ x we have X ∪ {x}∼X.

uals to experience multiple stimuli at once. Consequently,
those concepts of salience have difﬁculty explaining the
seemingly dysfunctional behaviors we examine. They also
cannot explain the behavior of subjects in our experiment.
This paper also builds upon several important literatures in psychology and neuroscience. Going back to Colin
(1953) and Broadbent (1958), psychologists have outlined
models of attention in which an individual is incapable
of attending to all stimuli to which she is exposed. Early
experiments were in the domain of listening in which individuals attempted to attend to one speciﬁc voice when
exposed to multiple sounds. Signiﬁcantly for the purpose of
our model, Colin (1953) found that when individuals were
exposed to a different voice in each ear, they could focus on
one or the other but could not follow both at once. Indeed,
subjects had no recollection of what was said by the nonfocal voice. Subsequent to these early experiments, similar
behavior was observed with regards to vision (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980), pain (McCaul and Haugtvedt, 1982), and
even anxiety (Borkovec and Roemer, 1995).
This inability to attend to multiple stimuli at once is consistent with the model we present. However, the simplest
version of our model implies that while individuals may
have control over which stimuli they expose themselves
to, they attend only to the most salient stimulus to which
they are exposed. This is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Individuals exhibit an ability to choose which stimulus they wish
to focus their attention on (Colin, 1953). They also exhibit
trouble, however, focusing on the preferred stimulus when
exposed to distracting stimuli that are particularly salient
(Lavie, 2010). Additionally, concentrating on a preferred
stimulus in the presence of salient distractions is mentally taxing and requires substantial effort (Boksem et al.,
2005).7 This motivates the GP representation of our model
which allows individuals to focus on a less salient stimulus with some cost to utility. The behavioral implications
in this extension are similar, however, to our simple case.

Axiom (Additivity). For every x ∈ A, x is exactly one of the
following: universally positive, universally negative, universally neutral.
More generally, we will refer to the additive model to
be not just those preferences that can be represented by
the functional form above, but to be all preferences satisfying the axiom Additivity. Note that Set Betweenness and
Additivity are generally opposed, as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 1. Suppose  satisﬁes {w}  {x}  {y}  {z}. Then 
cannot satisfy Additivity and Set Betweenness.
Proof. Suppose  satisﬁes Set Betweenness. Then we have
{x}  {x, y}  {y}, with one of these strict.
Case 1 – {x}  {x, y}. Then y is not universally positive or
universally neutral. However since {y}  {z}, Set Betweenness implies {y, z}  {z}. But this implies that y cannot be
universally negative.
Case 2 – {x, y}  {y}. Then x is not universally negative or
universally neutral. However since {w}  {x}, Set Betweenness implies {w}  {w, x}. But this implies that x cannot be
universally positive. 
Thus under Strotz and GP preferences, a stimulus is not
universally positive or negative — it depends on the set of
stimuli to which it is added.
3.2. Prior literature motivating our model
We conclude this section with a discussion on how our
model ﬁts in with other theoretical work in economics and
psychology. Though our model borrows the utility representations from Strotz’s and GP’s work in the temptation
literature, more broadly our model belongs to the growing literature on preference over sets (e.g. Kreps, 1979;
Bossert et al., 2000; Dekel et al., 2001). However, this literature generally views a set of alternatives as representing
an opportunity set from which the decision maker will
ultimately consume a single alternative in an unmodeled
future period, whereas in our model the decision maker
consumes (or experiences) all alternatives in the set. There
has been some work that considers preferences over sets
in which the alternatives are not mutually exclusive. But
this has usually been in the context of group choice, such
as purely hedonic games (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002),
voting (Barberà et al., 1991), and matching (Roth, 1985).
See Barbera et al. (2004) for a comprehensive review of the
literature on ranking sets.
Salience plays an important role in the work of Bordalo
et al. (2012, 2013b,a, 2015), Kőszegi and Szeidl (2012) and
Ellis and Masatlioglu (2017). However, while our work and
theirs do share the term ‘salience’, the implementation of
the idea is different. In their frameworks, salience is an
objective attribute of a product that attracts the focus of
an individual. In addition, this literature focuses on choice
from sets, and thus does not address the inability of individ-

4. Laboratory experiment
4.1. Experimental protocol
We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the
key predictions of our model, No Compromise and Set
Betweenness. The experiment was administered to each
subject individually in a private room. Upon signing the
consent form, the subject was asked to practice each of four
unpleasant tasks for 30 s. The tasks were: (1) listening to a
loud (85 decibel) ﬁre alarm sound through headphones, (2)
holding a hand in ice cold water, (3) doing 1 and 2 simultaneously, and (4) holding two hands in ice cold water.8

7
Psychologists have demonstrated that attention control is a cognitive
activity governed by the prefrontal cortex (Kane and Engle, 2002). Individuals with attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Swanson
et al., 2003), schizophrenia (Everett et al., 1989), and other mental disorders have substantially greater difﬁculty focusing attention on non-salient
stimuli.
8
While unpleasant, these tasks were in compliance with Occupational
Safety and Health Administration regulations and not deemed dangerous
by a physician. The Institutional Review Board of Brigham Young Uni-

7

L.J. Lefgren, O.B. Stoddard and J.E. Stovall

Journal of Health Economics 76 (2021) 102407
Table 1
Summary statistics.

To avoid potential order effects, subjects practiced each
task twice in random order. For the purposes of the current study, we focus on the ﬁrst three tasks, though in the
results section we brieﬂy discuss results from the fourth
task.
Participants were then asked to write down the minimum amount (from $0 to $15, in ﬁfty-cent increments) that
they would be willing to be paid to complete each of the
four tasks for 2 min. They were told that after they write
down the amount for each task, the experimenter would
randomly select one of the four tasks as well as one of ten
threshold amounts, ranging from $0 to $15, from an envelope. If the chosen threshold amount exceeds the minimum
amount listed by the subject for a particular task, the subject would receive that amount after she completes the task
for 2 min. If the threshold amount is less than the minimum
amount listed by the subject for a particular task, the subject would not have an opportunity to complete the task,
but would need to sit in the room for the remaining 2 min
until they can be paid a show-up fee of $2. This protocol
ensured that the amounts listed by the subjects were incentive compatible and strategy-proof. From these amounts,
we construct subjects’ preferences over the tasks.
To ensure the subjects’ understanding of the instructions, before writing down the amounts, they were asked
to answer multiple comprehension questions correctly to
proceed. At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a
post-experimental questionnaire intended to collect their
demographic information, including gender, age, university status, GPA, and study major. An average experimental
session lasted approximately 15 min and subjects earned
$6 on average, in addition to the show up fee.
Subjects in our experiment were students at Brigham
Young University recruited through email advertisements.
The exact content of the recruitment email and detailed
experimental instructions are included in the appendix.
Relating this experiment to our proposed model, let 
and h denote listening to the loud siren for 2 min and submerging one hand in ice water for 2 min respectively. How
a subject ranks ∅, {}, {h}, and {, h} (as revealed by his/her
reservation payments) will determine whether he or she is
consistent with a given model. For example, the ordering

Variable

Mean

Age

22.18
(2.21)
0.35
(0.48)
3.68
(0.34)
0.83
(0.38)
0.13
(0.34)

Female
GPA
White
Asian

reservation payment to perform task
Siren
One Hand in Water
Siren and One Hand
in Water
Two Hands in Water
Observations

$2.50
(2.21)
$4.12
(2.90)
$4.57
(3.17)
$5.28
(3.56)
60

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

4.2. Results
We collected data from 65 subjects. From this sample, we drop 5 subjects who stopped the protocol prior to
completion. This leaves us with an analysis sample of 60
subjects who completed the protocol. Table 1 shows summary statistics for these subjects. Consistent with the fact
that we recruited subjects in a university setting, the average age is approximately 22 years old. Only about a third of
our subjects are female and a majority are white. After practicing with all of the tasks, students reported the minimum
amount they would be willing to accept to perform each of
the tasks, which we refer to as a reservation payment. The
average reservation payments for the various tasks range
from $2.50 to $5.28.
We now turn our attention to the theoretical predictions of our model. Table 2 shows the fraction of subjects
exhibiting each preference ordering across sets of stimuli.
Note that only the preference orderings actually exhibited
by subjects are shown in the table. Table 3 shows more
concisely the fraction of subjects exhibiting preferences
consistent with each utility representation. Note that the
sum of these fractions exceeds one since some of these preferences are consistent with multiple models. Examining
the table, we see that 63 percent of subjects exhibit preferences consistent with the Strotz representation in that
the reservation payment is exactly equal to the reservation payment of one of the stimuli in isolation. 68 percent
exhibit preferences consistent with a GP representation
in that the reservation payment for both stimuli lies in
the closed interval between the reservation payments of
the two individual stimuli. Only 40 percent of subjects
exhibit additive preferences in which an additional stimulus increases the reservation payment. One individual (2
percent of subjects) demonstrates inconsistent preferences
in the sense that the subject reports no disutility from hear-

∅  {}  {, h}  {h}
is consistent with Set Betweenness, but not No Compromise or Additivity. Hence this ordering is consistent with
GP preferences, but not Strotz or additive preferences. As
another example, the ordering
∅∼{}  {, h}∼{h}
is consistent with No Compromise, Set Betweenness, and
Additivity. Hence it is consistent with Strotz, GP, and additive preferences.

versity approved the protocol. Kahneman et al. (1997) and others have
tested individuals’ responses to painful stimuli by having subjects place
their hand in cold water.
8
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Table 2
Preference ordering of various stimuli.
Preference ranking

Fraction

Consistent representations

∅  {}  {, h}∼{h}

0.27
(0.06)
0.02
(0.02)
0.05
(0.03)
0.20
(0.06)
0.07
(0.03)
0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.23
(0.06)
0.05
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
60

Strotz, GP

∅  {h}  {, h}∼{}
∅  {}∼{, h}  {h}
∅  {}∼{, h}∼{h}
∅∼{}  {, h}∼{h}
∅∼{}∼{, h}∼{h}
∅∼{}  {, h}  {h}
∅  {}  {, h}  {h}
∅  {}  {h}  {, h}
∅  {h}∼{}  {, h}
∅  {h}  {}  {, h}
∅∼{}  {h}  {, h}
Observations

tractions including watching TV, working in the ofﬁce, or
substance abuse. There is no reason to think that one person’s optimal distraction would necessarily be optimal for
a different individual.
To represent our results another way, Fig. 1 shows the
empirical CDF of subjects’ reservation payment for one
hand in cold water and listening to a siren divided by the
maximum reservation payment of the two stimuli in isolation. In our sample, all subjects for whom this ratio is
equal to or below one exhibit preferences consistent with
the GP and possibly Strotz representations.9 We see that
fully two thirds of individuals reveal a reservation payment
for the two stimuli less than or equal to the greater of the
two reservation payments corresponding to the individual
stimuli. There is a discontinuous increase in the density
at a value of 1 demonstrating that for many subjects the
disutility of two stimuli is exactly equal to the disutility
of the most uncomfortable individual stimulus. The behavior of a majority of subjects stands in stark contrast to the
prediction of any additive model in which each additional
stimulus should increase the subject’s reported reservation
payment.
One might be concerned that our results are driven in
part by individuals who do not ﬁnd the stimuli unpleasant.
The results are virtually identical if we exclude the 6 observations who report a reservation payment of 0 for one or
more stimuli.
As mentioned in our description of the protocol, we also
elicited from subjects their reservation payment for placing two hands in cold water. In this setting 35 percent of
subjects indicate the same reservation payment for placing two hands in water as for placing one hand in water. 2
percent (one subject) indicate a lower reservation payment
for two hands than for one. 63 percent require a reservation
payment for two hands that exceeds the reservation payment for putting a single hand into cold water. If we view
each hand as a separate stimulus, 35 percent of subjects in
this setting demonstrate preferences consistent with the
GP and Strotz representations. To the extent that placing
two hands in cold water represents an increased intensity
of the same stimulus relative to placing one hand in cold
water, this part of the protocol provides a less informative
test of the theory.

Strotz, GP
Strotz, GP
Strotz, GP
Strotz, GP, Additive
Strotz, GP, Additive
GP
GP
Additive
Additive
Additive
Inconsistent

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3
Fraction of subject preferences consistent with each utility representation.
Utility representation

Fraction

Strotz

0.63
(0.06)
0.68
(0.06)
0.40
(0.06)
0.02
(0.02)
60

GP
Additive
Inconsistent
Observations
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

ing the siren yet the reservation payment for the siren
and hand exceeds that of the hand alone. Collectively, the
experimental evidence strongly suggests that most individuals only have a limited ability to experience multiple
latent stimuli at the same time. Strikingly, the simple Strotz
model in which an individual is able to experience the
utility of only a single stimulus is sufﬁcient to explain a
majority of subjects’ decisions in this setting.
Note that while the experimental evidence is consistent
with our model for a majority of subjects, the siren serves as
an effective distraction for the hand in cold water for only
7 percent of subjects. In order for the loud siren to be an
effective distraction, it must be the case that the measures
of salience and disutility to be discordant across the two
stimuli. In other words, the siren needs to be less painful
and more salient than the hand in cold water. It may not
be surprising that only a minority of subjects experience
the stimuli in this fashion. It seems plausible that often
the most painful stimulus will also be the most salient.
However, in non-experimental settings individuals have
a potentially broad set of stimuli to choose from as dis-

5. Future research directions
Our model provides a simple framework for economists
to understand a variety of interesting behaviors relevant for
health and economics. Additionally, we present empirical
evidence suggesting this model is important for explaining human behavior. However, the simplicity of the model
and the lab setting of the empirical evidence provide room
for future researchers. In this section we outline possible
future directions both in terms of modelling and empirical
analyses.

9
It is possible for preferences to be inconsistent with the Strotz or GP
preferences and still have this ratio be less than one: {, h}  {}  {h} is
one such example. However none of our subjects exhibited such preferences.
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Fig. 1. Are reservation payments higher for two negative stimuli than for one?

Salience is a ﬁxed characteristic of a stimulus in our
model. However, psychologists (Higgins, 1996) have long
known that priming individuals about characteristics of
a situation or even their own identity can increase the
salience of particular dimensions of a problem, situation, or
identity. For example, Papoiu et al. (2011) ﬁnd that when
individuals observe someone scratching their skin, they are
more likely to experience itching sensations themselves.
More signiﬁcantly, counsellors will work with clients to
reframe the way in which they perceive the life situations or stimuli to which they are exposed. This implicitly
involves increasing the salience of some stimuli to improve
the client’s level of function and well-being. Similarly, brain
chemistry may affect relative salience of positive and negative stimuli. Consequently, salience of speciﬁc stimuli may
also be affected by psychotropic medications such as those
designed to alleviate clinical depression. It seems likely that
extensions of the model to endogenize salience would be a
fruitful research direction.

5.1. Model extensions
Psychologists, including Muraven et al. (1998), Muraven
and Baumeister (2000), and Schmeichel and Vohs (2009),
have established that individuals possess a limited capacity
for self-control in a variety of domains including emotional
regulation. In a dynamic extension of the model, it would be
interesting to explore the implications of a limited attention resource that could be allocated to focus on stimuli
which are not the most salient. For example, an individual could choose whether to allocate this limited attention
resource to focus on work instead of a headache. However,
such a decision could make it infeasible to later attend to
family responsibilities that are less salient than the ongoing
health challenge.
We currently don’t model how stimuli are either produced or alleviated. Instead, we outline a structure in which
individuals have preferences over sets of stimuli in which
the choice of available sets is outside of the model. As
researchers further investigate speciﬁc applications, it will
be helpful to place more structure on the process of how
stimuli come into being. Such extensions might also include
investigations in which stimuli can be moderated on the
intensive margin as well as the extensive margin, which is
the focus of our current analysis.
In our study, we assume that individuals can only experience a single stimulus. This assumption may work well in
some settings, such as our motivating examples or the setting we test in our experiment. However, it is certainly the
case that in other settings multiple stimuli can be experienced jointly. For example, music in conjunction with
ﬁne dining may be more pleasant than either in isolation.
Future researchers could aid in the reﬁnement of the model
through empirical studies that determine the settings in
which stimuli can be experienced jointly and settings in
which one stimulus acts to displace another.

5.2. Further tests of the model
While our experiment represents a convincing test of
our model, future researchers should consider additional
lab and quasi-experiments as well as observational analyses more closely aligned to the economic and clinical
phenomena that we used to motivate the model. For each
of our motivating examples, we outline possible protocols,
quasi-experiments, and data sources.
Thus far, analyses of NSSI have been primarily observational using convenience samples not generally available
to the public. Experimental tests to understand the reasons for NSSI are challenging due to the need to observe
10
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strict ethical and safety standards.10 Our model explains
NSSI as an effort of individuals to distract themselves from
painful psychological processes by exposing themselves to
a less painful but more salient physical stimulus. The key
testable implications of our model in this setting are that
1) the incidence of NSSI will be higher with an exogenous
increase in stressful events and 2) increasing the availability of non-harmful distractions can improve individuals’
ability to deal with stressful situations without engaging
in NSSI.
Testing this ﬁrst prediction can be effectively done providing that one can track NSSI behavior of individuals
and identify exogenous sources of psychological stress. For
example, one could follow a set of youth who found school
to be a very stressful setting. Following Jacob and Lefgren
(2003), one could observe whether NSSI was less common
during teacher in-service days when school was out of session to otherwise similar days when school was in session.
This would directly test the prediction of our model that
NSSI occurs as an endogenous response to negative stimuli.
The second implication could be tested experimentally
in a clinical setting. In the control group, individuals would
receive appropriate treatment for NSSI (Turner et al., 2014).
In treated group, this treatment would be supplemented
with joint explorations between the care provider and the
subjects regarding distractions which were less harmful
but also sufﬁciently salient to provide an effective distraction to emotional distress. Our model suggests that such
treatments could reduce the incidence of NSSI.
Considering our example of depression, we predict that
interventions that reduce the severity of depression should
increase engagement with activities that are insufﬁciently
salient to be enjoyed in the depressed state. One of the
sub-components of the commonly used Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS-6) asks whether individuals have
exhibited “loss of interest in activity, hobbies or work.” Our
model predicts that interventions that reduce the incidence
of depression should have the effect of improving this
sub-component of the HDRS-6. Consistent with our theory, experimental studies of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRI), a class of drugs used to treat depression,
have shown improvement in this domain (Hieronymus
et al., 2019). Data from many clinical trials registered at
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can be requested
at vivli.org. Additional tests of our theory could focus on
this measure of depression using new or existing datasets.

The key implication of the “trap of competing problems” example is that multiple problems lead to inaction
regarding any problem. In a lab setting, one can experimentally adjust the number of negative stimuli to which
an individual is exposed. Then one can see whether individuals exposed to multiple negative stimuli are less likely
to engage in costly actions to reduce any of them. Alternatively, consider a pool of subjects struggling to deal with
multiple problems. Our model suggests that the exogenous
provision of help with one problem should induce complementary efforts on the part of subjects to reduce the
severity of additional problems.
In observational settings, a test of the “trap of competing problems” could leverage information from the
American Time Use Survey (ATUS). In particular, one could
observe the extent to which individuals engage in distracting behavior (e.g. television watching or video games)
relative to productive behavior. However, this would need
to be coupled with information on the number of multiple
stresses to which an individual is exposed. For example,
our model would predict that some individuals who exogenously lose their job may engage in less home production
and instead engage in distracting activities. This would
be because the joint worries of job loss and home concerns would reduce willingness to invest in either one.
Fortunately, the ATUS samples subjects from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), which includes information on
employment status.
6. Conclusion
We reinterpret the Strotz and GP utility representations to provide insight into how people behave when they
have only a limited ability to experience competing latent
stimuli. One key insight from our model regards the complementarity of negative stimuli. In particular, once one is
experiencing a salient and negative stimulus the utility cost
of additional negative stimuli might be quite small. This can
lead to a variety of seemingly dysfunctional behaviors that
are nevertheless consistent with utility maximization.
In particular, our theoretical framework provides explanations for phenomena including destructive distractions,
an unwillingness to ameliorate negative situations in one’s
life, and the apathy of severe depression. In each of these
examples, actions that would seem to objectively improve
an individual’s life fail to be optimal if the beneﬁts are
insufﬁciently salient to rise above the pain of other life
circumstances. Furthermore, individuals may engage in
behavior that seems destructive if doing so provides a
salient distraction from a greater pain. Understanding
how these behaviors are optimal from a utility maximization perspective may provide researchers, policy makers,
and clinicians with insights regarding how to better help
individuals in these conditions. In particular, policies to
improve the circumstances of such individuals should take
into account the full set of latent circumstances and stimuli
to which an individual is exposed.
While our theory has a strong intuitive appeal, we also
present convincing empirical evidence that our theoretical framework predicts behavior in a setting with both real
payoffs and consequences. We ﬁnd that over two thirds of

10
Fox et al. (2017) provide experimental evidence on why NSSI engagement may make individuals feel better. Examining a population of
individuals with a history of self-harm, the researchers induced a negative mood by asking the subjects to spend 5 min writing about the most
signiﬁcant time “in which they failed or let themselves down in their
life.” Control subjects were exposed to no additional stimulus while other
subjects were also exposed to a physically painful stimulus. One might
predict that, according to our model, individuals exposed to a physically
painful stimulus would experience improved mood relative to the control
group. However, this presupposes that the priming of negative experiences induced greater distress that was both more painful and less salient
than the physically painful stimulus. If this condition doesn’t hold, there is
no reason to expect mood or perceived utility to improve by the addition
of a painful physical stimulus to a painful psychological stimulus.
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individuals exhibit preferences consistent with our framework in an experiment in which subjects are exposed to
single and multiple painful stimuli. In particular, after experiencing the stimuli together and in isolation, 68 percent
of individuals experience the same or less disutility from
two painful stimuli than one of the stimuli in isolation.
This suggests that, at least in this experimental context,
our framework explains the majority of peoples’ choices in
a way that runs counter to what an additive model would
predict.

tions. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask these
questions as we move forward.
If you complete the study, you will receive at least $2
for your participation. The exact amount that you will be
paid at the end of the study depends on your decisions, as
I will explain shortly.
There are four tasks that you will need to perform during
this experiment. To begin, we would like you to experience
and practice each task for 30 s, two times (for a total of eight
practice runs). We would like you to:
Treatment 1:

Authors’ contribution

Treatment 2:

All three authors have contributed to the paper equally
and are jointly responsible for the accuracy of the published
work.

Treatment 3:
Treatment 4:

Appendix A. Appendix – Experimental protocol

The subject listens to a loud siren-like sound
(at 85 decibels) through headphones.
The subject submerges one hand in ice-cold
◦
water (41 F) up to the wrist.
The subject submerges both hands in ice-cold
water up to the wrists.
The subject submerges one hand in ice-cold
water up to the wrist while listening to a loud
siren-like sound through headphones.

Next, you are asked to write down the minimum
amount (in 50 cent increments, up to $15) that you would
be willing to accept to do one of these tasks for 2 min. You
will need to write down the minimum amount for each
task, but only one of them will actually be selected for you
to do. These four envelopes contain all four tasks. After you
complete this sheet, you will select an envelope containing
one of the four tasks.
Also, prior to the study, we have randomly chosen 10
different threshold amounts between $0 and $15 and have
placed each one in an envelope. After you indicate the minimum amount you are willing to accept to do the task,
you will be asked to choose one of the envelopes at random reveal the threshold amount. If the minimum amount
you are willing to accept for the chosen task is less than
the threshold amount, then you will be paid the threshold amount once you complete the task for 2 min. If the
amount you are willing to accept is more than the threshold
amount, then you will not have an opportunity to complete
the task, and will be paid a $2 show up fee to sit in the room
for the remaining 2 min.
Note that it is in your best interest to state the true minimum amount that you are willing to accept since you can
never receive less than that amount, but you can end up
with a lot more.
To make sure that you understand the instructions, consider two hypothetical examples:
Example 1: Suppose that the minimum amount that you
listed to do the chosen task is $5. We draw the threshold
amount of $7.
Question: Will you have to do the task? How much will
you earn?
Example 2: Suppose that the minimum amount that you
listed to do the chosen task is $5. We draw the threshold
amount of $3.
Question: Will you have to do the task? How much will
you earn?

A.1 Email announcement
New time-slots are available for the research study
“Economics of decision making” next week. If you are
interested in participating, please sign up for an available
session of “Economics study on decision making.” Please
show up on time to your scheduled session in room 340
TNRB (Behavioral Lab).
*The link that will be provided (http://byumarriott.sona-systems.com/Default.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2f)
which will direct the students to the SONA recruitment
site where they can sign up for a session. They will see the
following details about the project before they sign up.
Study name: Economics experiment on decision making.
Brief abstract: In this study you will participate in a task
that will involve listening to a loud (85 dB) sound as well as
holding your hands submerged in cold water. You will also
complete a short demographic questionnaire. Please read
the eligibility requirements carefully before you sign up to
participate.
Eligibility requirements and risks: To participate in the
study, you need to have good hearing and be willing to have
your hands submerged in uncomfortably cold water for up
to 5 min. If you have poor hearing and/or use a hearing
device, you cannot participate in the experiment.
Also, be aware that there are certain medical preexisting conditions, such as circulatory, rheumatological,
and autoimmune disorders, which could cause longer-term
symptoms. If you have any of these conditions, you will not
be able to participate in this experiment.
Duration: 15 minutes
Pay: $6 on average, depending on your decisions.
The exact compensation amounts range from $2 to $15,
depending on your decisions.
If you have any questions, please contact the primary
researcher, Olga Stoddard, Ph.D. at olga.stoddard@byu.edu
A.2 Participant instructions

A.3 In-Experiment Questionnaire
Welcome and thank you for your participation in this
study. Please follow along as we read through the instruc-
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What is the minimum amount (in 50 cent increments,
up to $15) that we would have to pay you to do one of these
tasks for 2 min?
Task
Listen to the loud siren sound through the
headphones
Hold one hand submerged in ice cold water
Hold two hands submerged in ice cold water
Hold one hand submerged in ice cold water
while also listening to loud siren through the
headphones
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A.4 Post-Experimental Exit Questionnaire
Participant ID #:
1. What is your age?
2. What is your gender?
M(=1) F(=2)
3. What is your ethnicity?
(0=Caucasian, 1=Asian, 2=Hispanic, 3=African American,
4=Other)
4. What is your major at BYU?
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5. What is your GPA?
6. What is your marital status?
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7. How easy were these instructions?
100=Hard)
8. Did you like the experiment?
Yes(=1) No(=2)
9. Do you have any comments regarding this experiment?
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